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ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT
CPLR 308(4): Affixing summons to defendant's former residence
ineffective to confer jurisdiction notwithstanding plaintiff's rea-
sonable mistake nor defendant's receipt of process
CPLR 308(4)23 permits service of process by "affixing the sum-
mons to the door of either the [defendant's] actual place of busi-
ness, dwelling place or usual place of abode" and mailing it to his
"last known residence" when service by delivery 24 cannot be ac-
(1966). Failure to challenge an order of dismissal by direct appeal in the original action may
itself be a contributing factor to a finding of neglect to prosecute. See Flans v. Federal Ins.
Co., 56 App. Div. 2d 615, 618, 391 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (2d Dep't 1977) (Martuscello, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 881, 374 N.E.2d 365, 403 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1978); Hymowitz v.
Soprinsky, 24 App. Div. 2d 750, 263 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1st Dep't 1965). Confronted with such a
judicial sentiment, it is submitted that the most effective review of the merits of a dismissal
order is upon direct appeal.
23 CPLR 308(4) (Supp. 1979-1980). CPLR 308 provides for service of process upon a
natural person by the following methods:
1. by delivering the summons within the state to the person to be served; or
2. by delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable age
and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of
abode of the person to be served and by mailing the summons to the person to be
served at his last known residence; ... or
4. where service under paragraphs one and two cannot be made with due
diligence, by affixing the summons to the door of either the actual place of busi-
ness, dwelling place or usual place of abode within the state of the person to be
served and by mailing the summons to such person at his last known residence;
... or
5. [i]n such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if ser-
vice is impracticable under paragraphs one, two and four of this section.
2 Under CPLR 308, alternative and independent methods of service by delivery are
available. See CPLR 308(1), (2) (1972); note 23 supra. Personal delivery is one method.
"Deliver and mail" service, as an alternative to personal delivery, is of recent origin. Under
the Civil Practice Act, service other than by personal delivery, so-called "substituted ser-
vice," was obtainable only by court order. CPLR 308 as originally enacted permitted "de-
liver and mail" or "nail and mail" service without a court order, but only if personal deliv-
ery could not have been made with "due diligence." See CPLR 308, ch. 308, § 308
[1962]N.Y. LAWS 1316 (current version at CPLR 308(2) & 308(4) (1972)); SIXTEENTH ANN.
REP. OF THE N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE A38 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SIXTEENTH ANN. REP.];
SIEGEL § 71. The excessive hardships imposed to process servers attempting to comply with
the statute led to an abuse known as "sewer service," the fraudulent practice of serving
process in an unauthorized manner and then executing false affidavits of service. SIXTEENTH
ANN. REP., supra, at A38; see Note, Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J. L. Soc.
PROB. 17, 22 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sewer Service]; Comment, Sewer Service and Con-
fessed Judgments: New Protection for Low-Income Consumers, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS - CIv.
LIB. L. REv. 414, 422 (1971) [hereinafter cited as New Protection].
In an attempt to ease the problem, the service requirements of CPLR 308 were liberal-
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complished with "due diligence. '2 5 This provision, authorizing
what is commonly known as "nail and mail" service, traditionally
has been construed narrowly to require affixation upon the defen-
dant's actual dwelling or place of abode, determined as of the mo-
ment of service. 26 Recently, in Feinstein v. Bergner,27 the Court of
Appeals affirmed this interpretation, 28 holding "nailing" upon a de-
fendant's former residence invalid despite his actual receipt of the
summons and the plaintiff's reasonable good faith effort to perfect
service.29
In Feinstein, the plaintiff commenced an action for her per-
sonal injuries and her husband's wrongful death arising from an
automobile accident. At the accident scene, the defendant, then re-
siding with his parents, gave their address as his.3 0 The plaintiff,
ized by bisecting subsection 3 into the current "deliver and mail" and "nail and mail" sub-
divisions. See SIXTEENTH ANN. REP., supra, at A38; CPLR 308, commentary at 206 (1972).
Whereas "deliver and mail" service is now permitted without first resorting to personal de-
livery, "nail and mail" service is authorized only after diligent attempts to effect personal
delivery and "deliver and mail" service are unsuccessful. It should therefore be noted that
although "deliver and mail" service was substantially liberalized, "nail and mail" service
remained virtually unchanged.
25 CPLR 308(4) (Supp. 1979-1980). A finding of "due diligence" has been defined as
requiring a process server to make several visits on separate occasions and at different times
at both the defendant's actual residence and place of business, if known. SIEGEL § 74; see
Barnes v. City of New York, 70 App. Div. 2d 580, 416 N.Y.S.2d 52 (2d Dep't), appeal dis-
missed, 48 N.Y.2d 630, 396 N.E.2d 475, 421 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1979); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 52
Misc. 2d 950, 277 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1969).
26 Chalk v. Catholic Medical Center, 58 App. Div. 2d 822, 823, 396 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865
(2d Dep't 1977); Polansky v. Paugh, 23 App. Div. 2d 643, 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 961, 961 (4th
Dep't 1965) (per curiam); Entwistle v. Stone, 53 Misc. 2d 227, 228, 278 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20-21
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1967); Smithtown Gen. Hosp. v. Quinlivan, 88 Misc. 2d 1031,
1034, 389 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1976); CPLR 308, commentary at 97
(Supp. 1979-1980); SIEGEL § 72.
A showing that the defendant has misrepresented his correct address is generally a suc-
cessful defense to his jurisdictional challenge on the grounds that the process was not affixed
upon his actual dwelling or place of abode. In these cases, the defendant may be estopped
from raising this challenge. See, e.g., Greenwood v. White, 25 App. Div 2d 73, 73, 266
N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1013-14 (3d Dep't 1966); Cohen v. Arista Truck Renting Corp., 70 Misc. 2d
729, 731, 335 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31-32 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972); cf. Schenkman v.
Schenkman, 206 Misc. 660, 662, 136 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), af'd, 284
App. Div. 1068, 137 N.Y.S.2d 628 (2d Dep't 1954) (defendant estopped after misrepresent-
ing his identity); Kenworthy v. Van Zandt, 71 Misc. 2d 950, 954, 337 N.Y.S.2d 481, 483-84
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (defendant estopped after misrepresenting he would
await plaintiff).
2 48 N.Y.2d 234, 397 N.E.2d 1161, 422 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1979), aft'g 62 App. Div. 2d 1049,
404 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d Dep't 1978).
28 48 N.Y.2d at 239, 397 N.E.2d at 1163, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
29 Id. at 241, 397 N.E.2d at 1164, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60.
11 Id. at 237, 397 N.E.2d at 1162, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
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unaware that the defendant had moved from his parents' home
and had established his own household, attempted service at the
parents' home.3 ' Having made two unsuccessful attempts to effect
service by delivery, the plaintiff's process server affixed the process
to the parents' door and mailed a copy of the papers to the same
address. The father thereafter forwarded the process to the defen-
dant.3 2 The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied a motion to dis-
miss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, reasoning that the
defendant was estopped from raising the defense of statutory non-
compliance because his father's mailing the process to him, rather
than returning it to the plaintiff, "effectively concealed" the defen-
dant's departure.3 3 Reversing, the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, found that an estoppel was precluded by the absence of
fraud or misrepresentation. 4
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed,35 declining to invoke an
estoppel, since the defendant had not purposely acted to conceal
his new address and had no affirmative duty to inform the poten-
tial plaintiff of a change of residence.3 6 Judge Gabrielli, writing for
the majority," concluded that CPLR 308(4) "clearly requires" af-
fixing at the defendant's actual dwelling or place of abode and not
at the defendant's last known residence.38 While finding support in
, Id. The defendant neither supplied the Postal Service with a forwarding address nor
removed his name from his parents' door. Id. at 242, 397 N.E.2d at 1165, 422 N.Y.S.2d at
360. He did, however, notify the Motor Vehicle Bureau approximatly a year and one-half
before the action was commenced of his changed address, and he promptly acquired a tele-
phone, with the number listed in the Brooklyn telephone directory. 62 App. Div. 2d 1049,
1050, 404 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (2d Dep't 1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 234, 397 N.E.2d 1161, 422
N.Y.S.2d 356 (1979). Whether his new address also was listed is unclear. See id.
32 Id. at 238, 397 N.E.2d at 1162, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
33 Id.
31 62 App. Div. 2d at 1050, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
35 48 N.Y.2d at 244, 397 N.E.2d at 1166, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 361. The Court accepted as
not erroneous as a matter of law the lower courts' determinations that "due diligence" has
been exercised in the attempts to serve defendant under CPLR 308(1) and (2). Id. at 238,
397 N.E.2d at 1162-63, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
36 Id. at 241-42, 397 N.E.2d at 1164, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
37 Judge Gabrielli was joined by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler,
and Meyer. Judge Fuchsberg dissented in a separate opinion.
38 48 N.Y.2d at 239, 397 N.E.2d at 1163-64, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 358-59. The Court declined
to decide whether the parents' home qualified as the defendant's "usual place of abode." Id.
at 239 n.3, 397 N.E.2d at 1161 n.3, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 358 n.3. Noting that although there may
be a distinction between this term and "dwelling place," id.; see Rich Prods. Corp. v. Dia-
mond, 51 Misc. 2d 675, 678-79, 273 N.Y.S.2d 687, 691 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1966); CPLR
308, commentary at 207 (1972), the Feinstein panel found the defendant's contacts with his
parents' home insufficient to establish a "usual place of abode" apart from his actual dwell-
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the unanimity of lower court decisions 9 and in the legislature's use
of dissimilar terminology in distinguishing between the nailing and
mailing requirements, ° the Court viewed as significant the absence
of substantive change in CPLR 308(4) when the legislature liberal-
ized other portions of the statute.41 Reasoning that such abstinence
reflected a legislative determination that additional liberalization
of the provision would undermine constitutional notice require-
ments,42 the Feinstein majority concluded that the distinction in
terminology must be preserved and that strict compliance with the
statute is required.43 Finally, the Court observed that the phrase
"last known residence" was not a "mere redundancy" but was di-
rected to those situations in which the plaintiff is aware of the de-
fendant's actual place of business while the defendant's actual resi-
dence remains unknown.44
Judge Fuchsberg, dissenting, found the statute ambiguous and
urged its liberal construction "so as not to foreshorten the legiti-
ing place. 48 N.Y.2d at 239 n.3, 397 N.E.2d at 1161 n.3, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 358 n.3; see
Smithtown Gen. Hosp. v. Quinlivan, 88 Misc. 2d 1031, 1033-34, 389 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777-78
(Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
39 48 N.Y.2d at 239, 397 N.E.2d at 1163, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 358; see note 26 supra.
40 48 N.Y.2d at 239, 397 N.E.2d at 1163, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 358. Relying on the rule of
statutory construction that dissimilar words in a series do not impart the same meaning, the
Court reasoned that the legislature must have intended "dwelling place" to be different
from "last known residence" by requiring affixation to the former and mailing to the latter.
Id.; see N.Y. STAT. § 231 (McKinney 1971); text accompanying note 44 infra.
41 48 N.Y.2d at 240, 397 N.E.2d at 1163-64, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 358-59; see note 24 supra.
42 48 N.Y.2d at 240, 397 N.E.2d at 1164, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 359. Although the Court rec-
ognized that affixation upon the defendant's last known residence would facilitate service of
"hard-to-find" defendants, it found such a rule to be unacceptable because adequate notice
to be "readily accessible defendant" would not be guaranteed. Id. (citing Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950)).
43 48 N.Y.2d at 240, 397 N.E.2d at 1164, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 359. The Court dismissed the
contention that the use of different locations for "affixing" and for "mailing" created an
"inherent inconsistency." Id. at 241, 397 N.E.2d at 1164, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 359; see id. at 243,
397 N.E.2d at 1165, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Reasoning that the last
known residence is identical to the actual residence where the latter is known and that
service would be "literally impossible" without mailing to the former when only the actual
place of business is known, the Feinstein Court concluded that the legislature's use of the
different terms was deliberate. Id. at 241, 397 N.E.2d at 1164, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
44 Id. at 241, 397 N.E.2d at 1164, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 359. The Court also reaffirmed that
subsequent actual receipt of notice by the defendant does not cure the defect caused by
deviation from the statutory scheme. Id. (citing McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d
111, 114-15, 238 N.E.2d 726, 728, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331-32 (1968)); see Isaf v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 579, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (3d Dep't 1969); Ives v. Darling, 210
App. Div. 521, 522, 206 N.Y.S. 493, 494 (3d Dep't 1924); Loeb v. Star & Herald Co., 187
App. Div. 175, 179, 175 N.Y.S. 412, 414-15 (1st Dep't 1919).
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mate claims and expectations of litigants. '45 Noting that CPLR
308 had been revised to overcome prior difficulties in securing ju-
risdiction over "hard-to-find" defendants,4 the dissent argued that
the majority decision subverted the legislature's intent.47 As consis-
tent with this intent, Judge Fuchsberg suggested that the word
"actual" should be understood to limit "place of business" only
and that "dwelling place" and "usual place of abode" should be
deemed equivalent to "last known residence. '48
While the result reached in Feinstein comports with a strict
construction analysis of CPLR 308(4), 49 the decision falls to pro-
tect adequately some plaintiffs who endeavor to avail themselves of
the provision. Since satisfaction of the "due diligence" requirement
of CPLR 308(4) apparently does not determine whether the subdi-
" 48 N.Y.2d at 242, 397 N.E.2d at 1165, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting)
(citing CPLR 104 (1972); N.Y. STAT. § 325 (McKinney 1971)).
.6 Id. at 243, 397 N.E.2d at 1165, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); see
note 24 supra.
17 48 N.Y.2d at 243-44, 397 N.E.2d at 1166, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (Fuchsberg, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Fuchsberg, however, agreed that an estoppel was unjustified. Id. at 242, 397
N.E.2d at 1165, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 243, 397 N.E.2d at 1166, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (citing
N.Y. STAT. § 254 (McKinney 1971)).
Judge Fuchsberg's dissent has been described by one commentator as "interesting."
McLaughlin, Jurisdiction, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 1. Although one sympathizes
with his apparent desire to avoid a harsh result, there appears to be little legal foundation
for his suggested construction of CPLR 308(4). Initially, by finding ambiguous the use of
different terms for the "nailing" and "mailing" locations, see note 45 and accompanying text
supra, Judge Fuchsberg apparently failed to perceive both the logic of the majority's ratio-
nale, see note 43 supra, and that the ambiguity, if any, instead lies in the distinction be-
tween "dwelling place" and "usual place of abode," see note 38 supra, and not between
these locations and "last known residence." See id.
Additionally, the liberalization of CPLR 308 in 1970 had no substantive effect on the
original "nail and mail" provision. See note 24 supra. Thus, Judge Fuchsberg's suggestion
that the legislative history serves as a foundation for permitting liberal construction of
CPLR 308(4), see note 46 supra, seems unsupported. Similarly, it is submitted that his
reliance on CPLR 104 as supportive of such a construction is misplaced. See note 45 supra.
Although CPLR 104 provides for the liberal construction of the civil practice laws and rules,
see CPLR 104 (1972), as a general provision it is subservient to the command of the specific
provisions of CPLR 308. See N.Y. STAT. § 238 (McKinney 1971); E. CRAWFORD, THE CON-
STRUCTION OF STATUTES § 167 (1940).
Finally, the suggestion that the "last antecedent" doctrine, see Foote v. People, 56 N.Y.
321, 328 (1874); N.Y. STAT. § 254 (McKinney 1971), requires that the word "actual" modify
only the term "place of business" is apparently a misapplication of the rule. Since the doc-
trine is only applicable to qualifying words in the middle of a sentence or clause, see id., it
does not govern an introductory qualifying term, which here is "actual." Cf. Budd v. Valen-
tine, 283 N.Y. 508, 511, 29 N.E.2d 65, 66 (1940) (subsequent general words, not within rule,
modify entire sentence, not merely last antecedent).
19 See notes 39 & 42 accompanying text supra.
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vision has been complied with properly,50 and since a defendant
generally owes no duty to inform a potential plaintiff of address
changes, 51 Feinstein indicates that a plaintiff must seek conclusive
verification of a defendant's actual location or risk dismissal. Al-
though in most instances extensive verification may be accom-
plished by checking with the Motor Vehicle Bureau,52 and Postal
Service,53 and the defendant's insurer,54 the plaintiff whose verifi-
cation attempts unknowingly fail because the defendant has not
registered his address change with these sources is apparently
without a remedy.5
10 That "due diligence" was found notwithstanding that the plaintiff attempted deliv-
ery only twice and not at the defendant's actual location, see 48 N.Y.2d at 238, 397 N.E.2d
at 1162, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 357-58, may indicate a retreat from the generally stricter require-
ments for such a finding. See note 25 supra. At minimum, the Feinstein decision suggests
that a process server attempting "nail and mail" service cannot relax in his attempts to
verify the defendant's actual premises once he believes that he has met the "due diligence"
standard.
51 See note 36 and accompanying text supra. In contrast to its position in Feinstein,
the Court of Appeals, in Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d
161 (1968), intimated that in automobile accident cases, the defendant may be required to
inform the plaintiff of address changes "until [the defendant] is reasonably assured that no
claim will be asserted against him." Id. at 504, 236 N.E.2d at 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 172-73.
52 See [1980] 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 160.1; Department of Motor Vehicles Form MV 15 (1977)
(Registration Information Request Form). All persons who are licensed to drive or who own
automobiles in New York have a statutory duty to inform the Motor Vehicle Bureau of
address changes. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 401 (3), 501 (1) (McKinney 1970).
83 The Postal Service will forward mail for 1 year only. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POSTAL
SERVICE MANUAL 158.2 (1978). Had the Feinstein defendant notified the Postal Service of
his new address when he moved, therefore, the summons would have been returned to the
plaintiff marked "forward expired," U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL 159.14
(1979), thereby putting her on notice of improper service. Similarly, had the defendant's
entire family departed from their home, the Postal Service, even if not formally notified,
probably would have become aware of the move because of the vacant house. In such a case,
the summons would have been returned marked "moved, left no foward," id., and the plain-
tiff would have been put on notice. Under the peculiar facts presented in Feinstein, how-
ever, the Postal Service apparently never became aware of the defendant's move. Thus, if
the plaintiff had requested a verification by the Postal Service that the defendant still re-
sided at his parents' address, see 39 C.F.R. § 265.6(d)(1), (7) (1979), she would have received
an affirmative answer.
See Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 504, 236 N.E.2d 451, 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161,
172 (1968); Gilbert v. Lehman, 73 App. Div. 2d 793, 423 N.Y.S.2d 712 (4th Dep't 1979). In
Gilbert the court indicated it would be reasonable to expect a potential defendant to keep
his insurance carrier informed as to his whereabouts. Id. at 794, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 713-14.
Where the plaintiff was supplied with an incorrect address by the carrier, however, service
attempted under CPLR 308(4) at the address provided will nevertheless be invalid unless
there is proof that the insurer provided the incorrect address to frustrate the service. Id. at
793, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
" Clearly, where verification indicates that the defendant has moved but that his pre-
sent address is unknown, service pursuant to CPLR 308(5) is possible. See, e.g., Van Dunk
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It is suggested that in such cases, where service under CPLR
308(4) was "impracticable" in retrospect, court-ordered service
should be approved nunc pro tunc.58 Such relief is supported by
legislative intent57 and would neither prejudice the defendant s nor
promote the fraudulent service practices which led to revision of
v. Lazrovitch, 50 Misc. 2d 649, 270 N.Y.S.2d 803 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966); note
56 infra. It is ironic that where verification produces inaccurate information, there is no
basis for court-ordered service under CPLR 308(5).
It is suggested that in the absence of guidelines on the manner and extent of verification
procedures necessary to escape the hardship demonstrated in Feinstein, the plaintiff at
minimum should check with the Motor Vehicle Bureau, the Postal Service, and the defen-
dant's insurer and perhaps should complete the "mailing" requirement by use of registered
or certified mail with delivery restricted to the defendant. See U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, DoMES-
TIC MAIL MANUAL 153.17 (1979). Such an extensive effort appears to be necessary since reli-
ance on information from any one of these sources may not prove sufficient, see The Pitfalls
of Substituted Service Under CPLR 308 N.Y.S. LAW DIG. No. 239 (Nov. 1979), and the
defendant's failure to promptly notify these sources apparently will not give rise to an es-
toppel, see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
56 See CPLR 308(5) (Supp. 1979-1980). Resort to court-ordered service pursuant to
CPLR 308(5), under which the court can fashion any reasonable method of service which
comes within the boundaries of due process, is permitted only after the court determines
that service under subdivisions one, two, and four of CPLR 308 is "impracticable." See
CPLR 308(5) (Supp. 1979-1980); SIEGEL § 75.
Nunc pro tunc orders entered under CPLR 308(5) have been used in analogous situa-
tions. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Rodgers, 32 App. Div. 2d 558, 300 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dep't 1969);
Totero v. World Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1963), discussed in CPLR 308, commentary at 215 (1972). Clearly, where a defendant has
left no trace of his current location and the sources checked by the plaintiff indicate that he
still resides at his old address, realistically, the defendant's location is undiscoverable, a fact
justifying CPLR 308(5) treatment. See, e.g., Van Dunk v. Lazrovitch, 50 Misc. 2d 649, 270
N.Y.S.2d 803 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
Furthermore, there would appear to be more compelling reasons for approving such an
order in the Feinstein situation in which the plaintiff acts out of unavoidable ignorance
than in Totero where the plaintiff was aware of the "impracticability" before he fashioned
his own "substituted" service. Compare 41 Misc. 2d at 595, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 872 with note
53 supra. It is unclear, however, if the Feinstein plaintiff attempted such verification.
17 The legislative advisors to the CPLR stated that the aim of Article 3 was "[to make
it possible ... to take full advantage of the state's constitutional power over persons." SEc-
OND REP. 37. Moreover, the existence of "nail and mail" service is evidence of a legislative
attempt to liberalize the methods of service, particularly as reflected by the deletion of its
court-ordered requirement when the CPLR replaced the CPA. See note 24 supra. Thus,
under a recognized legislative policy of permitting in personam jurisdiction where constitu-
tionally sound, see FIFTH REP., 264-65, use of a nunc pro tunc order, since it is not prejudi-
cial to a defendant, see note 58 and accompanying text infra, would be permissable to avoid
unjustifiable hardships on a plaintiff. See notes 53 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
8 See Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 504-05, 236 N.E.2d 451, 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d
161, 172 (1968). Where a plaintiff, therefore, unaware of the "impracticability" of service a
defendant has created, attempts service in such a manner as a court would have directed
had it been petitioned, the defendant stands no worse off than had the petition been made
at the outset.
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the statute.5 9 It is submitted that in the absence of court-ordered
relief or of sufficient verification guidelines,60 the use of CPLR
308(4) under Feinstein is perilous at best.
Bruce Pearl
CPL § 330.20: Persons involuntarily committed pursuant to CPL
entitled to procedural and substantive safeguards guaranteed in-
voluntary civil detainees
CPL § 330.20 requires that a person acquitted of criminal
charges by reason of mental disease or defect be committed to a
mental institution. 1 A person committed pursuant to this section
59 See note 24 supra. Moreover, the ease with which the plaintiff's verification attempts
could be proved should militate against fraudulent proof of such efforts.
60 The necessity for verification criteria may be more imperative in non-automobile in-
jury cases where the possibility of checking with either the Motor Vehicle Bureau or the
liability insurer is removed.
61 CPL § 330.20(1) (1971) provides in pertingut part:
Upon rendition of a verdict of acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect, the
court must order the defendant to be committed to the custody of the commis-
sioner of mental hygiene to be placed in an appropriate institution in the state
department of mental hygiene. . . . Such defendant is entitled to the assistance of
the mental health information service.
Acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect is governed by N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05
(McKinney 1975) [hereinafter cited as PENAL LAW § 30.05], providing in pertinent part:
1. A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such con-
duct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to know
or appreciate either:
(a) The nature and consequence of such conduct; or
(b) That such conduct was wrong.
2. In any such prosecution for an offense, lack of criminal responsibility by rea-
son of mental disease . . . is a defense.
Prior to 1960, under the Code of Criminal Procedure § 354, commitment was within the
discretion of the trial judge. One court, however, while finding the discretionary commit-
ment statute constitutional, held that it could be invoked only if an acquitee was found so
insane at the time of acquittal as to be a menace to the public. People ex rel. Peabody v.
Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N.Y.S. 322 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 196 N.Y. 525, 89 N.E.
1109 (1909); see Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome Extended: The Treat-
ment of Mentally Ill "Non-Criminal Criminals" in New York, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 393
(1969). More recently, the Court of Appeals held that mandatory commitment for testing
does not offend constitutional guarantees. People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 23, 224 N.E.2d 87,
91, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 659 (1966). Notwithstanding the finding of validity, CPL § 330.20 has
undergone frequent "judicial amendment," see note 92 infra, leaving judges free to interpret
the statute in any way that conforms to the constitution and resulting in a lack of uniform-
ity of construction. See People v. McNelly, 83 Misc. 2d 262, 371 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975); R. PITLER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 12.66 (1972 & Supp. 1979);
Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, The Insanity Plea in New York State, 1965-1976, 51 N.Y.S.
